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TL;DR
Report URI says malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organizations through Optimizely Web on Nov. 16, after an attacker altered customer project code. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and notified affected customers; the full scope of exposure and how the attacker gained access remain unclear.
Malicious JavaScript reached visitors to sites run by Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC, Salesforce and other organizations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform on Nov. 16, according to security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI. Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability to add code to some customer projects, making the incident a supply-chain exposure through a third-party script rather than a reported hack of each listed website.
Report URI says it found the code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked and identified 178 organizations whose visitors were served the malicious JavaScript. The researcher cautioned that the total could be higher. BleepingComputer independently used urlscan.io results to confirm that the script loaded or attempted to load on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN and Salesforce.
The payload was designed to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, capture payment-card details entered into a site’s own form fields, and collect cookies and screenshots. Report URI also says the code could direct iPhones and iPads to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. These are reported capabilities and delivery observations; they do not establish that every visitor was successfully compromised or that payment details were stolen.
Report URI observed the first Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on Nov. 16 and says the affected files had been cleaned by 23:11 UTC, about 19 hours later. Optimizely’s Nov. 17 status notice says it fixed the vulnerability and removed injected code from affected projects. The company also told BleepingComputer it ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected user accounts.
Optimizely script attack · Nov 13 – Nov 17, 2026
How one trusted script carried malware to 178 websites
The sites were not hacked themselves. The code arrived inside a file they loaded on purpose.
The route (schematic)
Whether any iPhone was compromised has not been shown.
Timeline (UTC)
- Nov 13Earlier wave through three other providers’ scriptsKissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media
- Nov 16 04:21First Optimizely injection seen
- 08:28Address-swapping payload first seen on a site
- 13:43Card skimmer added
- 17:13iPhone exploit delivery widened
- 19:24Report URI sweep: 186 of 1,611 snippets infected
- 21:52Only 1 of 188 infected snippets left
- 23:11All infected Optimizely files cleaned
- Nov 17 01:02Optimizely confirms the incident on its status page
Sources: Report URI (Scott Helme), Nov 16, 2026, timeline and update of Nov 17; Optimizely status page, Nov 17, 2026; Hudson Rock (Infostealers.com), Nov 16–17, 2026. The route is a schematic.
Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI
Risks From a Trusted Web Script
The incident shows how a change to a third-party script trusted by many sites can expose visitors across unrelated organizations. Optimizely Web customers load a small JavaScript snippet from the platform; that snippet can include customer experiments and optional Project JavaScript that runs on pages. Report URI says the attacker inserted code into that project field while leaving the rest of each snippet untouched. Visitors therefore could receive the code from an address their browser was already permitted to load.
The reported behaviors matter because they target actions people may take while using an otherwise familiar site: copying a wallet address, entering card details, or browsing with an out-of-date mobile device. The risk was not necessarily the same for every visitor. Report URI says the code’s actions depended on the device and what a person did on the page, and that hosted payment iframes such as Stripe and Adyen were outside the card-skimming code’s reach. Affected site names alone do not show that every page, checkout, customer account or visitor was exposed.
For organizations, the findings also raise questions about how browser security policies can limit injected scripts. Report URI says that among 159 affected organizations whose policies it checked, 24 blocked the code and 68 had no policy. Those counts describe the organizations reviewed, not every company on the affected list.
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How the Optimizely Injection Worked
Optimizely Web is used to run experiments on websites, such as testing different page versions. Customers place a JavaScript snippet on their sites, and Optimizely serves it. Report URI says the attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript field of customer projects; the snippet continued to come from Optimizely’s address, which affected sites already trusted. The researcher said this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack.
Optimizely’s status page, posted at 01:02 UTC on Nov. 17, said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company told BleepingComputer that the weakness was in the Experimentation account signup flow and said it had notified affected customers. Report URI lists 178 organizations across sectors, with banking and finance the largest category at 32, followed by technology and software at 23 and retail at 20.
Report URI also described an earlier wave beginning Nov. 13, when the same actor’s injector appeared in scripts associated with Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. Those sites are separate from the 178-organization Optimizely list. Hudson Rock reported a similar pattern but said how the code entered those services remained unresolved.
“An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.”
— Optimizely, in a status-page update on Nov. 17
The Reach and Access Path
It remains unclear how the signup-flow vulnerability enabled write access across multiple unrelated customer projects. Optimizely has not publicly explained the flaw’s code-level mechanics in the information cited here. Report URI says its review covered 1,611 snippets and warns that the true number may be higher, so the complete reach has not been established.
The list of affected organizations also does not mean every page or service at each organization was exposed. Hudson Rock cautioned that an affected subdomain does not establish exposure across an organization’s full website, products, customer base or checkout system. The available findings do not establish how many people were affected, whether data was successfully taken, or whether visitors’ devices were compromised. Hudson Rock specifically characterized its iPhone findings as delivery observations rather than demonstrated infections.
Report URI says the script was rebuilt 26 times during the day and that visitors received the same script, but the reported count does not by itself indicate how many people encountered it or what actions they took. No confirmed total for stolen card details, cookies, screenshots or cryptocurrency has been provided in the source material.
Checks for Visitors and Customers
Visitors who used a listed site on Nov. 16 can check whether their device software is current. Report URI advised iPhone and iPad users to update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. That is precautionary guidance; it is not evidence that a particular device was infected. People who copied a cryptocurrency address while an affected page was open can verify the destination independently before sending funds. Anyone concerned about card details entered into a site’s own form can contact the card issuer and monitor account activity; the reported skimmer did not reach card entries in hosted payment iframes.
Organizations using Optimizely should review the company’s notices to affected customers and check their own project settings, site scripts and browser security policies. Optimizely says it removed the injected code, fixed the vulnerability, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset affected account access. Further technical detail on the signup-flow flaw, a complete account of affected projects and any confirmed evidence of data theft would clarify the incident’s scope.
Key Questions
What happened in the Optimizely incident?
Report URI says an attacker added malicious JavaScript to Optimizely customer projects, and visitors to sites using affected snippets received the code on Nov. 16. Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation platform.
Were all pages of the named organizations affected?
No such conclusion is supported by the published list. Report URI identified affected organizations and sites, but a listed organization may have had only a particular subdomain or project affected. Hudson Rock says an affected subdomain does not establish exposure across an organization’s entire website or customer base.
Does the report prove that visitors’ iPhones were hacked?
No. Report URI says the code could direct iPhones and iPads to exploit kits. Hudson Rock described its findings as delivery observations, not demonstrated iPhone compromises. Report URI advised users to update their devices as a precaution.
What should visitors check?
Install a current iOS version if using an iPhone or iPad, and independently verify cryptocurrency addresses copied while an affected page was open. People who entered card details into a site’s own form may contact their card issuer and watch for unexpected activity. These steps do not establish that a visitor was compromised.
Has Optimizely fixed the issue?
Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability and removed injected code from affected projects. The company also said it ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts and notified affected customers. The public information cited here does not explain exactly how the flaw allowed access across customer projects.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
